This paper tests the hypothesis that monopoly power of school districts allows bureau cratic expansion and fosters poor academic performance in the public school system in California. Evidence indicates that monopoly power is positively associated with employment of administrator s and teachers, and therefore supports the bureaucratic expansion hypothesis. While numbers of teachers do not in¯ uence performance meas ures, numbers of administrator s are shown to positively aOE ect performance ± results that suggest that too many teachers, but too few administrators , are employed. While bureaucracy theory may explain the resource misallocation, other reasons might include rising public pressures on hiring teachers over administrators , spending equal ization policies, and the weak California economy in the period under investigation .
I . I N T R O D U C T I O N
of administrators and shift resources to other endogenous inputs such as teachers and other staOE are present, It is commonplace to blame poor education performance on resources could be misallocated in the sense that too lack of teachers or funding, but it is uncommon to blame many other resources are employed relative to administra poor performance on lack of administrators. A growing tors. California has recently implemented class-size reduc public perception is that US public schools are increasingly tion policies that, in eOE ect, shift resources toward teachers burdened by bureaucracies that sti¯e creativity of teachers and away from other resources. While such reallocation through standardizatio n and control of their activities. may raise performance, it is important to recognize that Over-expanded bureaucracies are also believed to crowdpublic policy changes are not private market-driven as out funding that might be better allocated to teachers, equipwould occur when pro® t-maximizing ® rms reallocate ment and other inputs in the production of education.
resources due to competitive pressures. Rather, public poliDespite appearances of growing support for this view, little cies are chosen within public or political markets, and, as empirical evidence is available with which to assess whether the public perceives that there are too many administra or not school bureaucracies have over-expanded . This paper tors, pressures arise to reallocate resources away from examines what role school bureaucracies play in the peradministrators and towards other inputs. Whether reallo formance of the public school system of California, where cation improves performance by allocating resources more student performance or achievement is measured by SAT e� ciently is an empirical issue. (School Achievement Test) scores and dropout rates.
Resource misallocation might also arise when school disThat performance is inversely related to bureaucrati c size tricts or states experience signi® cant changes in school within an over-expanded public school system is one populations, state budgets, or adverse economic environ hypothesis. A counter-hypothesi s is that bureaucracies ments. California has experienced a dramatic rise in are too small and therefore their expansion would raise student population ± over 1.2 million since 1983± 1984, performance. This could arise in various ways. If, for which represents more students than currently served by 1 instance, substantial public pressures to minimize numbers 42 other states. Moreover, during much of the 1990s
Unless otherwise stated, data in this section is from California Department of Education and the California Legislative Analyst's O� ce.
1 California lagged behind most other states in output growth which has signi® cantly reduced revenues for state and local governments. These factors appear to have sig ni® cantly impacted the public school system. While spending-per-studen t was roughly at the US average in 1976, California averaged US$4724 per student in 1994± 1995, which was US$1170 less than the national average of US$5894 and contributed to a national ranking of 42.
2
Even under strong economic conditions it is debatable that resources are e� ciently allocated in public markets, but it becomes more doubtful during times of economic distress. Although conditions may be temporary, the possi bility remains that bureaucratic resources are too scarce and their expansion would raise performance, even though public pressure may result in further contraction. These hypotheses are examined on a data set that includes all school districts in California over 1992 and 1993. The focus on California provides a rich and large data set to examine the role that bureaucracy plays on academic per formance. The public school system (primary and second ary) is the nation's largest with 1002 school districts, employing over 410 000 employees, with over 11 000 admin istrators, and servicing over 5.3 million pupils. Funding in 1996± 1997 was $32 billion. Over 12% of children in kinder garten through grade 12 reside in California, or one of eight US students in 1994± 1995. The focus on California also provides for an empirical examination within a common set of funding constraints. California's Proposition 98 of 1988 guarantees a minimum level of state support for all schools and is an important determinant of school spending levels. As each state has its own budgetary institutions and mandates, cross-state examination may incorrectly conclude that variation in academic performance or resource employ ment is caused by bureaucracy when that variation results from diOE erences in budgetary institutions. Most states also attempt to equalize across school districts on the basis of income and past performance, but do so with diOE erent inten sity, and therefore equalization eOE orts are also potentially important factors that explain cross-state variation in performance. This paper avoids these problems by empiri cally testing hypotheses using data only on California and therefore eliminates cross-state diOE erences in budgetary institutions and equalization eOE orts that would otherwise in¯ uence relationships between bureaucracy and perform ance of public school systems.
Bureaucrats, or administrators , are both substitutes of and complements for other inputs in the production of educa tion. In their managerial role they allocate resources and, to some degree, assume risk that eOE orts do not meet per formance standards placed on them by elected politicians and/or voters and parents. They are complements since their productivity is linked with employment of other inputs such as teachers, staOE , and classrooms. Administrators have substitutes since other employees may also take on the managerial roles of decision-making on various activities such as teaching methods and overall policy-making. Administrators provide a vital function in the production of education but, as with any scarce resource, may be overused or underused relative to other resources. Optimality conditions for the e� cient allocation of administrators follow from conventional production theory that models production as a function of marginal products of inputs, input costs, and budgets. Optimal allo cations arise when marginal product-to-resourc e price ratios are equal across inputs as developed in the standard isoquant and iso-budget model of microeconomics. Inputs are administrators, teachers, other staOE , buildings, land and other endogenous inputs that produce education. Optimal levels of inputs for a given education budget arise when reallocation that raises production without cost ing more is impossible.
Some inputs such as parentage and socioeconomic char acteristics are exogenous in the sense that public schools cannot pick-and-choose students. However, these inputs are important because they may aOE ect productivity of endogenous inputs such as teachers or administrators. For instance, heterogeneous student bodies cause marginal products of teachers and administrators to vary by school. Similarly, input prices, as well as budgets, vary across locations thus causing variation in optimal input ratios. Optimal resource allocation will therefore vary across locations and suggests that simple observation of variation in student± teacher or administrator ± teacher ratios across schools do not necessarily indicate varying degrees of e� ciency.
Education in a monopolistic market
The growing literature on government monopoly suggests that public school systems are characterized by a high degree of monopoly power. Private competitive markets are generally believed to allocate resources e� ciently, but Niskanen' s (1971) theory of bureaucracy predicts that resources are not e� ciently allocated in public markets that lack competition and control by sponsors such as elected o� cials or parents in the case of education. Bureaucracy theory predicts that, because pro® t maximiza tion is not a goal of bureaus, other rewards are pursued. In public education, rewards may include maximization of budgets, salaries and employees, as well as pursuit of amenities such as vacation time, plush o� ces and attractive classrooms. Academic performance is another possible pursuit, but this direction would only be emphasized in competitive settings and/or when administrators are eOE ec tively constrained by sponsors (parents or politicians) that prefer this direction. At issue is the extent to which mon opoly conditions allow administrators to pursue goals that favour their interests over interests of those who want a public school system that e� ciently delivers high perform ance.
Within a public exchange model whereby voters/parents and policymakers determine education policies, voters/ parents communicate via voice and exit options to school administrators.
3 Voice options include voting and expres sing views directly to administrators and exit options indi cate the extent to which dissatis® ed parents may move their children from one school to another as they search for preferred education programmes. Exiting is a last resort, as developed in Charles Tiebout' s (1956) model of `voting with-your-feet', and exercised when parents conclude they cannot eOE ectively in¯ uence local policies through voice options. The Leviathan model of Brennan and Buchanan (1980) argues that credible threats of exit are an eOE ective means of maintaining or improving programme quality because policymakers are better able to pursue selfinterests when few exit doors are available. With relatively few competitors, the Leviathan model predicts that administrators are able to pursue policies re¯ ecting their narrow interests such as bureaucratic over-expansion , as opposed to simply pursuing parental interests of high quality education.
Public school systems in California oOE er limited exit options. It might appear that choices are plentiful with over 7700 public schools in over 1000 school districts and 57 counties, but parents are routinely assigned particular schools within their districts. 4 These `exclusive territories' spawn local monopolies whereby parents must undertake costly relocation if they send children to better schools, even though moves may be just a short distance. Exclusive territory arrangements limit exit options and, according to the Leviathan model, allow academic per formance to suOE er as administrators are freer to pursue self-interests.
Financing of public education also discourages competi tion from private schools since individual tax assignments are mostly unrelated to whether one has school-age chil dren or to numbers of children.
5 This is simply a conse quence of the ability-to-pay principal of taxation whereby tax bills are not assigned on the basis of bene® ts received, as well as attempts to tax third-part y bene® ciaries of public education. Primary recipients of public education are there fore essentially charged zero unit prices and stands in direct contrast to private education where unit prices re¯ ect non zero marginal (private) costs. Private education carries a unit price that far exceeds the zero unit price of public education and, as a result, public education dominates pro vision of education as this price advantage keeps the pri vate education market relatively small and perhaps not a particularly strong competitive threat to public education. Until school vouchers or other policies signi® cantly break the price advantage, the public market will undoubtedly continue to dominate the education market.
6 Currently, the public market controls over 90% of the market at the primary and secondary level in the USA, as measured by dollars spent on education.
A small private market in education indicates lack of competition and may suggest signi® cant monitoring prob lems for parents/taxpayers who are interested in high academic performance. Niskanen (1971) argues that mono poly conditions allow public employees to operate at rela tively high levels of autonomy from sponsors when there are high monitoring costs and lack of private market coun terparts with which to make comparisons of such items as costs and performance. Since relatively few school person nel are elected, and given the autonomy that tenure oOE ers many teachers, sponsors are likely to ® nd oversight a rela tively di� cult endeavour, especially when there are limited private market counterparts with which to make compar isons. Indeed, such conditions may make it extremely di� cult for sponsors to eOE ectively assess whether arguments for higher funding made by school administrators and teachers' unions stem from self-interested attempts to over-expand or genuine attempts to improve educational performance in least-cost manners.
California' s system of shared taxation may also encou rage monopoly power in the public school system. 7 Local school districts used to be mostly funded by local revenues, but for the last 25 years funding has been dominated by decisions made in the state capital of Sacramento. Propositions 13 and 98, with the latter passed in 1988, mandate minimum funding guarantees for kindergarten through community colleges. Proposition 98 constraints now account for roughly 80% of total funding. Perhaps the most important constraint is imposed by the Serrano v. Priest ruling of 1972 in which the Supreme Court of California mandated restructuring of the school ® nance system to virtually eliminate spending diOE erences between school districts on the basis of wealth. In eOE ect, court rul ings mandated that ® nance be tied to a system of shared taxation whereby the state government was responsible for collecting taxes from local governments and then returning revenues to school districts on the basis of factors such as numbers of students and redistribution in the direction of poorer districts. This funding system limits abilities of local o� cials to make local funding decisions and constrains the ability of school districts to compete with one another on the basis of how well they use local funds to deliver quality school programmes.
Some school districts ± especially wealthy ones ± did not like the system of shared taxation. Fischel (1989) argues that Proposition 13 was caused by Serrano since it allowed high property value school districts/counties to bypass some of the redistribution required by Serrano. Proposition 13 capped property tax rates and growth in assessed value, reducing by 54% the amount of property taxes available to fund services provided by cities, counties, school districts, and other agencies.
8 Silva and Sonstelie (1995) ® nd that Serrano created some equalization across school districts, but also contributed to a statewide decline in average funding per student. The US General Accounting O� ce (1997) concludes that California needs to shift 35% more state funds from wealthy to poor or middle-income districts in order to meet equalization cri teria, with current imbalances resulting from wealthier dis tricts raising supplemental fees and parental contributions as well as political forces in the redistribution process.
California's shared taxation system contributes to school district monopoly power to the extent that it reduces exit options of parents who are dissatis® ed with funding deci sions of local school administrators. In eOE ect, shared taxa tion protects and increases monopoly positions of school districts since it restricts inter-district competition on the basis of taxation, thus eOE ectively creating one large mon opoly government from which parents cannot easily escape, and according to the Leviathan view, to poor per formance of public schools.
Implications of monopoly view
An implication of the monopoly view is that school admin istrators have an interest in over-expanding that exceeds their interest in improving educational performance. As discussed above, over-expansion may take place in any of the endogenous inputs of the education production function, but it is increasingly common to predict over expansion in the hiring and associated funding of admin istrative positions. A testable hypothesis is then that the greater is monopoly power of public school systems, the greater is administrative over-expansion which leads to lower academic performance. Anderson et al. (1991) take the monopoly model a step further with the prediction that administrators prefer to over-expand by hiring additional non-teachers over teachers because the latter enjoy higher autonomy and are therefore more di� cult for administrators to control. Expansion of secretaries and clerks are also hypothesized to provide non-pecuniary income to administrators in the form of services. Non-teachers are also less organized than teachers which creates less trouble for administrators because unions attempt to mandate work rules and hiring practices that favour teachers. Finally, because teachers are often tenurable, they enjoy relatively high autonomy from administrators. Empirical investigation of cross-state vari ations in 1984 reveal support for their predictions since states with relatively large educational bureaucracies tend to perform relatively poorly on standardized tests and also tend to have relatively high dropout rates. They also ® nd that greater employment of non-teachers and aides exert negative eOE ects on performance, but teachers exert positive eOE ects on performance.
However, it should be noted that non-optimal alloca tions of educational inputs do not necessarily indicate pres ence of an inverse relation between administrative resources and performance. As Brewer (1996) discusses, too many administrators may be re¯ ected in diverse ways. In an extreme version, an inverse relation between administrative resources and performance exists, as when their employment is characterized by marginal products below zero, and therefore, simple scaling-back of adminis trators raises total product or performance. Under this version, a negative coe� cient on administrative employ ment would be found in a regression explaining perform ance. A weaker version has administrators not exerting direct negative eOE ects on total performance, but nonethe less they are less productive than other inputs such as teachers. Shifting a dollar at the margin from administra tors to teachers raises performance, but note that this weaker version of unproductive administration does not indicate an inverse relationship between administrators and performance since marginal products are positive. But, the positive marginal in¯ uence of another dollar spent on teachers or other inputs exceeds that of adminis trators under this weaker version as would be evidenced by diOE erences in estimated coe� cients (divided by their sal aries) in regression equations. Brewer (1996) ® nds little In a study of public schools in California, Downes (1996) ® nds evidence that school districts had monopoly power before and after Proposition 13, though somewhat less so after Proposition 13. Evidence of bureaucratic behaviour was that administrators substituted improved student performance for greater numbers of administrative staOE . consistent evidence of statistically signi® cant eOE ects of school administration on educational performance in his study of 700 New York school districts over 1978± 1987.
I I I . O T H E R R E A S O N S F O R I N E F FI C I E N C Y
While it may be true that ine� cient allocation of adminis trators causes poor performance, not all ine� cient alloca tions are necessarily a product of bureaucratic monopoly power. There are various reasons apart from self-serving behaviour for why administrators may be poorly allocated in public school systems. One possibility stems from equal ization policies that attempt to distribute funding equally across locations, but are not tied to optimal resource allo cation. For instance, equalization will not tend to promote more teachers-assistant s in area A simply because they are relatively cheap or more productive and discourage hiring of teachers-assistant s in area B simply because they are relatively more expensive and less productive. Although such allocations would be e� cient, it is questionable that equalization mandates focus on providing more e� cient resource allocations. It is more likely that equalization eOE orts focus on providing funding that creates uniformity in teacher± student ratios and other parameters that are believed to be strongly linked to academic performance. However, as previously argued, with diOE erences in input prices and marginal products there is no reason to suspect that uniformity in teacher± student ratios would re¯ ect optimal allocations across schools. Moreover, there appears to be little evidence that such input ratios are systematically linked to student performance. 10 This dis cussion suggests that equalization eOE orts may mandate ine� cient input combinations and therefore contribute to poorer academic performance. Mandates may create too few or too many administrators and in this way exert an independent eOE ect on allocation of administrators (as well as other inputs) that in¯ uences the relationship between administrators and academic performance and is apart from how equalization may create monopoly power that administrators exploit by over-expanding their domain.
Public pressures to limit administrators, but expand teachers or other inputs, may cause ine� cient resource allocation as well. In 1996, California approved a classsize reduction initiative that in eOE ect raises the hiring prior ity of teachers. If such policies are inconsistent with improved resource allocation, then another reason for inef ® ciency arises that is unrelated to monopoly powers of school bureaucracies. Note that these policies may cause a positive empirical relation between administrators (or other inputs) and performance when schools that are not subject to such pressures allocate e� cient levels of admin istrators that exceed areas under pressure to hire too few administrators. This scenario suggests that greater num bers of administrators are positively related to performance and therefore provides a counter-hypothesi s to the extreme version that predicts a negative relationship between administrators and performance.
Finally, because resource reallocations arise in response to many factors such as changes in input prices, productiv ity (technology), budgets, as well as public perceptions and laws, changes take time to fully occur. Reallocations may be especially transitory during times of signi® cant econ omic distress of the order that California experienced in the early to mid-1990s. Although temporary, resource allo cations in any particular year are not necessarily e� cient, and therefore we must be careful not to conclude that ex amination of one or more year's of data necessarily indi cates steady-state equilibrium relationships between administrators and performance. California appears to be playing `catch-up' with students± teacher ratios and other input-related parameters and therefore this examination of the 1992± 1993 relationships are not necessarily long-term relationships nor are they necessarily indicative of relation ships in other states.
I V . EM P L O Y E E A N D P E R F O R M A N C E EQ U A T I O N S
Relationships between employees and performance are ex amined using counties in California as the unit of observa tion. The basic hypothesis is that monopoly power expands hiring beyond e� cient levels, which then in¯uences per formance of public schools. This paper focuses on employ ees as the vehicle for bureaucratic over-expansion and separately considers three types of employees: administra tors, teachers, and non-teachers. The following models of cross-county school employment and performance are estimated:
where EMPLOYEE i ˆ administrators , or teachers, or non-teachers, per primary and secondary student, 9 Brewer (1996) suggests a third version based on the hypothesis that adverse eOE ects on performance will be exerted more often by central administrators than local administrators. This is consistent with the Brennan and Buchanan (1971) hypothesis that argues that cen tralization of government promotes its over-expansion. Brewer (1996) ® nds some support for this third hypothesis that predicts that the greater the number of central administrators, the lower is overall performance. 10 In a well-cited study that examines 65 studies in the input± output literature, Hanushek (1986) ® nds little evidence that such input ratios are linked to student performance. The seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) method is used to estimate the parameters of the system of employ ment and performance equations by accounting for con temporaneous correlation in the errors across equations. This is a recursive model that consists of a series of en dogenous variables that are considered as a group because they appear to bear a close conceptual relationship to one another. Employment and performance measures are often grouped together as indicators of public school perform ance by both the public and educators and therefore the SUR technique appears to be appropriate here. Relationships between these equations are indicated when the error terms of these equations are correlated and, in this case, the SUR model allows for more e� cient estimates than would arise under estimation by ordinary least 11 squares.
Six equations are estimated since there are three types of employment (teachers, non-teachers, and administrators) and three performance measures (math SAT, verbal SAT, and drop out rates). Data for these variables are available for most of the 57 counties for 1992 and 1993, and the system of equations are estimated separately for each year. Two sparsely populated counties did not participate in many of the data collection eOE orts of the California Department of Education. Signi ® cance of estimated coe� cients is based on two-tailed tests at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels.
Unless otherwise indicated, raw data are provided by the California Department of Education and usually was avail able at the level of school districts. These data were aggre gated to the county level and then compiled into a master ® le with data collected from other sources. Data at the county level collected from the California Statistical Abstract of 1996 are: population, area in square miles, and median numbers of years of schooling. All data are available for 1992 and 1993, except for median education, which was only available for 1990. It is appropriate to use counties as the unit of observation since school districts in California are organized and overseen by county superin tendents. Therefore, while there are various numbers of school districts within each county, they all come under 12 the same superintendent, or central administrative o� ce.
All counties operate under similar equalization eOE orts that are administered at the state level, and the data aggregation allows consideration of the variation that is measured across counties, but at the same time, intergovernmenta l or interschool competition is measured within each county by the Her® ndahl score.
Equation 1 shows the hypothesized determinants of three measures of school employees: administrators, teachers, and non-teachers. 13 Three measures are consid ered so as to investigate whether greater monopoly power exerts diOE erential eOE ects on diOE erent employee classi® ca tions. Previous discussion suggests that such a breakdown is appropriate. Anderson et al. (1991) argue that bureau cracy theory predicts that administrators prefer to hire non-teachers over teachers, and the breakdown into three types of employees allows examination of whether diOE er ential eOE ects are displayed. Previous discussion also indi cated that an ine� cient allocation of employees does not necessarily require a negative relationship between admin istrators, or other employees, and performance. Rather, ine� ciency may be present even though marginal products are positive, and reallocation from one input to another raises performance. This model allows one to determine if one or more employee classi® cations yields, at the mar gin, higher gains in performance than another classi® ca tion.
The Her® ndahl index score is the sum of squares of school districts' total enrolment within a school district. Howsen (1992, 1993) use Her® ndahl scores to measure intergovernmental competition and ® nd that less concentration is related to higher performance of pub lic schools. In Equation 1 it is hypothesized that higher levels of concentration lead to greater monopoly power that enables over-expansion of employment. The Her® ndahl score based on 12th grade enrolment was also measured but because it did not alter the empirical results, those estimations are not be displayed here. Numbers of school districts is expected to exert a positive eOE ect on employment based on the assumption that greater scale economies associated with centralization of supply are signi® cant and therefore more districts require more employees ± especially administrators and non-teaching staOE . Population density is anticipated to exert a positive in¯ uence on employment based on the assumption that urban areas have greater problems associated with crime and congestion, and a greater number of non-English speaking students that require more employees than rural areas.
The determinants of the three measures of performance are listed in Equation 2. These measures are the Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) scores on verbal and math tests and the dropout rate. As discussed above, the eOE ects of num bers of employees on performance are ambiguous. The extreme version of the monopoly model hypothesizes a negative eOE ect whereby higher employment lowers per formance and is often expressed for the administrative component of employment. However, a weaker version of the monopoly model hypothesizes that positive eOE ects of employment on performance also provide evidence of the monopoly model when marginal products divided by resource prices of administrators are below those of other staOE . The hypothesized sign on the employee variable is therefore an empirical question to be resolved by the data.
The Her® ndhal score is expected to exert a negative in¯ uence on performance based on the monopoly model that predicts that greater monopoly power allows em ployees to pursue their interests at the expense of higher performance. Population density is expected to exert a negative in¯ uence on performance because of the common perception that urban areas have more problems that might negatively in¯ uence performance (e.g. crime, conges tion, unemployment, and poverty) than rural areas. The percentage of high school seniors taking SAT tests is expected to exert a negative in¯ uence on test scores because a higher test-taking pool means that more lower-aptitude students are included in the pool. Median education is expected to be positively related to performance based on the expectation that higher educational achievement of parents /communities positively in¯ uences academic achievement of public school students. Table 1 displays summary statistics of the variables from the pooled sample. A few observations follow. Average employees per student ratios are 0.003 (administrators) , 0.049 (teachers), and 0.007 (non-teachers). There are roughly 333 students per administrator, 20 students per teacher, and 143 students per non-teacher. SAT verbal scores exhibit an average of 419 (out of a possible 800), with a range of 456 to 364. SAT math scores exhibit an Table 1 . Summary statistics average of 476, with a range of 528 to 419. Dropout rates range from 0± 8% , with a mean of 3.65% . Her® ndahl scores average 0.295 and range from 1.0± 0.056. Table 2 displays SUR estimations of employment and per formance equations for 1992. The ® rst column displays estimation of the teachers per student equation. The Her® ndahl score exerts a positive, as hypothesized, and signi® cant in¯ uence on numbers of teachers thus providing evidence that market power results in higher use of teachers. Numbers of school districts exerts a positive, as hypothesized, and signi® cant in¯ uence on teachers. No in¯ uence is exerted by population density. The second col umn displays estimation of the non-teachers per student equation. The Her® ndahl score does not exert a signi® cant in¯ uence on numbers of non-teachers, while numbers of school districts exerts a positive, as hypothesized, and sig ni® cant in¯ uence on non-teachers. No in¯ uence is exerted by population density. The third column displays estima tion of the administrators per student equation. The Her® ndahl score exerts a positive, as expected, signi® cant in¯ uence on numbers of administrators, and numbers of school districts exerts a positive, as hypothesized, and signi® cant in¯ uence on administrators . Density exerts a signi® cant negative eOE ect on administrators ± an eOE ect opposite to expectations.
Estimation of the 1992 equation
Column 4 displays estimation of the verbal SAT score equation. Teacher and non-teacher variables do not exert signi® cant eOE ects, but number of administrators exerts a positive eOE ect on scores thus indicating that counties with more administrators tend to exhibit higher scores. The Her® ndahl score exerts a positive (unexpected) and signi® cant eOE ect on verbal SAT scores. Population density exerts a negative (as expected) and signi® cant in¯ uence on verbal scores. Percentage of seniors taking SAT tests exerts the expected negative and signi® cant in¯ uence on verbal scores. Median education exerts the expected positive and signi® cant in¯ uence on verbal scores. Column 5 displays estimation of the math SAT score equation. No employment category exerts a signi® cant eOE ect on scores. The Her® ndahl score exerts a positive (unexpected) and signi® cant eOE ect on math SAT scores. Percentage of seniors taking SAT tests exerts the expected negative and signi® cant in¯ uence on verbal scores. Median education exerts the expected positive and signi ® cant in¯ u ence on verbal scores.
Column 6 displays estimation of the dropout equation. While teachers do not exert a signi® cant eOE ect on dropout rates, non-teachers (positive) and administrators (negative) exert sign® cant eOE ects. That is, higher numbers of nonteachers appear to raise dropout rates, while higher num bers of administrators lower dropout rates. Population density exerts a positive and signi ® cant eOE ect on dropout rates, and median education exerts a negative, as hypothe sized, and signi® cant eOE ect on dropout rates. Table 3 displays SUR estimations of employment and per formance equations for 1993. The ® rst column displays estimation of the teachers± student equation. The Her® ndahl score exerts a positive, as hypothesized, and signi® cant in¯ uence on numbers of teachers thus providing evidence that market power results in higher use of teachers. Numbers of school districts exerts a positive, as hypothesized, and signi® cant in¯ uence on teachers. No in¯ uence is exerted by population density. The second col umn displays estimation of the non-teachers per student equation. The Her® ndahl score does not exert a signi® cant in¯ uence on numbers of non-teachers, while numbers of school districts exerts a positive, as hypothesized, and sig ni® cant in¯ uence on non-teachers. No in¯ uence is exerted by population density. The third column displays estima tion of the administrators± student equation. The Her® ndahl score exerts a positive, as expected, signi® cant in¯ uence on numbers of administrators, and numbers of school districts exerts a positive, as hypothesized, and sig ni® cant in¯ uence on administrators. Density exerts a sig ni® cant negative eOE ect on administrators ± an eOE ect opposite to expectations. With the exception of density exerting a signi® cant eOE ect on numbers of administrators (versus no eOE ect in 1992), the results of the ® rst three columns mirror those found in 1992.
Estimation of the 1993 equation
Column 4 displays estimation of the verbal SAT score equation. Teachers do not exert signi® cant eOE ects (as in 1992), but numbers of non-teachers exert a negative eOE ect on verbal scores (versus no eOE ect in 1992). As in 1992, numbers of administrators exert a positive eOE ect on verbal scores. Unlike the positive and signi ® cant eOE ect in 1992, the Her® ndahl score does not exert a signi® cant eOE ect on ver bal SAT scores. As in 1992, population density exerts a negative and signi® cant in¯ uence, the percentage of seniors taking SAT tests exerts negative and signi® cant in¯ uence, and median education exerts the expected positive and sig ni® cant in¯ uence on verbal scores.
Column 5 displays estimation of the math SAT score equation. No employment category exerts a signi® cant eOE ect on math scores ± thus mirroring results in 1992. Contrary to 1992, the Her® ndahl score no longer exerts a positive and signi® cant eOE ect on math SAT scores. Density 
Notes:
refer to signi® cance at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels.
exerts a positive and signi® cant eOE ect, versus no eOE ect in 1992. As in 1992, percentage of seniors taking SAT tests (negative) and median education (positive) exert signi® cant in¯ uences on verbal scores. Column 6 displays estimation of the dropout equation. As in 1992, teachers do not exert a signi® cant eOE ect. But, while non-teachers exerted a positive, but weakly signi® cant, eOE ect in 1992, it no longer exerts a signi® cant eOE ect. However, as in 1992, numbers of administrators exert a negative and signi® cant eOE ect on dropout rates. Unlike its positive and signi® cant eOE ect in 1992, population den sity does not signi® cantly in¯ uence dropout rates. Finally, median education continues to exert a negative and signi® cant eOE ect on dropout rates.
V . C O N C L U S I O N S
The hypothesis that monopoly power of school districts allows bureaucratic expansion and poor academic perform ance has been tested in the public school system of California. Evidence indicates that monopoly power is positively associated with employment of administrators and teachers, thus supporting the bureaucratic expansion hypothesis. No support is found for the case of nonteachers.
The hypotheses that higher employment of teachers and administrators exert negative eOE ects on performance, as measured by SAT scores and dropout rates, are not sup ported. Variation in numbers of teachers does not explain any variation in performance measures. However, higher employment of administrators is found to raise verbal SAT scores and lower drop out rates. Higher numbers of nonteachers are also found to lower verbal SAT scores (in 1993) and raise drop out rates (in 1992), thus providing some evidence that this employment group exerts negative eOE ects on performance. The evidence appears to suggest that California public schools hire too few administrators and too many non-teachers, based on the prediction that greater numbers of administrators and fewer non-teachers would raise verbal SAT scores and lower drop out rates. The evidence also indicates that performance diOE erences are unrelated to variation in numbers of teachers ± thus suggesting that the public push towards smaller class sizes may not raise student achievement.
While misallocation of sta� ng resources may suggest bureaucratic over-expansion , this result simply indicates that staOEresources are misallocated in the California pub lic school system. Bureaucracy theory is one model that explains resource misallocation, but others reasons may also explain why too many non-teachers and too few administrators appear to be hired. As just mentioned, ris ing public pressures that place hiring priorities on teachers may crowd-out non-teachers and administrators. Equalization policies may also contribute to resource misallocation when funding decisions focus on spending equality, which is not necessarily related to performance equality across schools and school districts. Public pres sures on hiring more teachers and spending equalization policies may therefore in¯ uence resource allocation and, because they do not emanate from competitive pri vate market pressures, they do not necessarily re¯ ect e� ciency-enhancing reallocations of school resources. The weak California economy in 1992± 1993 may also have played a role in misallocation that may be resolved over time.
From a public policy viewpoint, this paper suggests that a focus ± either by the public or policymakers ± on teacher± student ratios is not necessarily the most productive means of fostering higher performance in our public school systems. As previously discussed, e� cient resource alloca tion does not necessarily result in uniform teacher± student ratios across schools since marginal products, input prices, and budgets vary across schools. Public pressures and/or policymakers that force uniformity may contribute to lower overall performance when `magic' formulae for teacher± student ratios are promoted. It should also be noted that variation of sta� ng across schools does not necessarily indicate bureaucratic over-expansion since vari ation may simply be a product of schools trying to adopt their uniquely e� cient hiring ratios, or a product of public pressures to hire more teachers, equalization policies, or a weak economy. Moreover, it is di� cult to know what con stitutes e� cient sta� ng decisions when private market counterparts that must endure the competitive pressures of the marketplace are fairly weak or absent. When employment is related to monopoly power, Niskanen's theory of bureaucracy predicts that public school staOE operate at relatively high levels of autonomy from sponsors due to substantial monitoring costs and lack of private market counterparts with which to make comparisons of such items as costs and performance. Sponsors are there fore likely to ® nd oversight a relatively di� cult endeavour and it should not be surprising that arguments for higher funding are di� cult to assess since they may be selfinterested attempts to over-expan d or genuine attempts to improve educational performance in least-cost manners. However, given high monitoring costs and lack of com parative information in private markets, sponsor-focus on teacher± student ratios may be rational since it is a fairly easy statistic to view and compare across other public schools. Unfortunately, this paper provides evidence that even if rational for sponsors, reallocations towards other inputs such as administrators and away from teachers and non-teachers may oOE er more promise for performance gains.
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